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Abstract:  A widespread prudential measure limits the housing ex-
pense ratio—defined as the share of income spent on the rent or loan 
payment—to ensure household solvency. This policy is increasingly 
criticized, however, as it would induce households to settle far from the 
city center in search of lower housing prices, fostering urban sprawl. 
It would even prove counterproductive as high transport costs in dis-
tant areas would more than offset the lower housing costs. To avoid 
these unintended effects, several researchers advocate limiting the joint 
housing plus transport expense ratio instead. This paper aims to shed 
light on this issue by comparing the two prudential measures—limit-
ing either the housing or the housing plus transport expense ratio—
using the monocentric model. By constraining residential choices and 
reducing housing consumption, both policies improve household sol-
vency and reduce urban sprawl. While this seems to contradict previ-
ous claims, the joint constraint proves more efficient in both regards. 
Provided the constraint is not too stringent, both policies have limited 
impact on household welfare and often even improve welfare. But this 
time, capping only the housing expense ratio always dominates the 
joint housing plus transport constraint. A numerical application to 
the Paris region illustrates our findings for a real case study. Results 
suggest that replacing the current limitation of the housing expense 
ratio with a joint housing plus transport constraint would significantly 
improve household solvency and curb urban sprawl, with a negligible 
welfare loss. 
1 Introduction
The 2008 and 2011 surges in fuel prices raised concerns regarding the solvency of households, which 
we define here as their ability to meet all their expenses.1 The issue was especially salient in tight housing 
markets, where households already bear significant housing burdens.2 Although the recent drop in fuel 
prices has relieved households’ budgets, concerns remain over the long term as fuel prices are likely to be 
on the rise again. Given these circumstances, the relevance of capping the housing expenditure at a fixed 
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fraction of the household income—a measure already questioned in the past (Hare, 1995; Polacchini & 
Orfeuil, 1999)—has become even more controversial. This prudential measure is commonly enforced 
in several countries to preserve the solvency of households. In France, this is achieved in two ways:
• monthly payments for home loans are capped at one third of the household gross income, 28% 
in the U.S., according to Duca and Rosenthal (1994);
• prospective tenants should earn at least three times the required rent to apply—leading to the 
same prudential ratio as in the home-buying market.3
While this policy does seem to secure the solvency of households at first sight, it may spur some 
households to settle far from the city center in search of lower housing prices. This is for instance the case 
in the Greater Paris Region. The lack of affordable housing in the central part of the metropolitan area 
induces new homebuyers to settle farther and farther in the suburbs, thereby fostering urban sprawl (Po-
lacchini & Orfeuil, 1999). Suburban households also make intensive use of the car. This exposes them to 
high transportation costs, which combined to the housing burden jeopardize their budget equilibrium. 
To prevent these unintended effects, several researchers advocate the use of a joint constraint bearing 
on the sum of housing and transportation expenses instead of housing only (Hare, 1995; Polacchini & 
Orfeuil, 1999). Their aim is twofold: to raise public awareness of the extent of transport costs involved in 
suburban lifestyles, and to make near transit locations more affordable by raising home loan size (based 
on future savings on transport costs) for households looking to locate there.
This paper investigates whether one should include transportation costs within the prudential ratio. 
The current practice that limits the housing burden, referred to as the Capped Housing expense ratio 
policy (or CH policy), is compared to another including transport costs within the prudential ratio, 
the Capped Housing plus Transport (CH+T) expense ratio policy. The analysis is carried out using the 
monocentric model of urban economics. This allows us to study the effects of each policy on households 
(utility, budget breakdown) and on land use (city size, density, housing prices). After setting a few results 
in the general case, we consider a highly stylized framework: the linear city model. This specification 
yields closed-form solutions, which allows us to elaborate on the effects of both policies in the simplest 
possible manner. After extending the model to the more realistic case of elastic housing supply, we then 
apply it to the Greater Paris Region to provide a first appraisal of the effects of CH and CH+T policies 
in a real case study.
The paper structure is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Sections 3 and 4 investigate the ef-
fects of CH and CH+T policies, respectively, using the monocentric model. Section 5 extends the model 
used in Sections 3 and 4 to the case of elastic housing supply. Section 6 carries out a short numerical 
application to the Greater Paris Region. Last, Section 7 discusses the results and concludes with policy 
recommendations.
2 Literature review
2.1 Analysis of housing and transport burdens
While the urban economic literature has thoroughly investigated numerous land-use regulatory policies 
(Bertaud & Brueckner, 2005; Cheshire & Sheppard, 2005; Brueckner, 2009; Turner, Haughwout, & 
van der Klaauw, 2014), prudential measures enforced in housing markets have attracted less attention. 
Still, by studying housing and transport burdens, a first strand of the literature sheds light on the extent 
1 This encapsulates the standard definition of solvency as the household ability to meet its financial obligations on time, in 
particular mortgages.
2 For the remainder of the text, we will use the terms “burden” and “expense ratio” interchangeably to refer to the share of (gross) 
income dedicated to a specific budget item, e.g. housing or transport. The housing expense ratio is also sometimes referred to 
as the front-end (or front) ratio.
3 This ratio of 1 to 3 corresponds to a widespread practice in the Greater Paris Region, where some landlords may even require 
up to four times the rent. Income requirements may be less strict in other parts of France.
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to which households are effectively constrained by the maximum front-end ratio. Two elements are in 
fact central in motivating our paper, 1) that the CH policy does concern a sizable share of households, 
and 2) that spatial variations of transport costs do loom large relatively to the housing burden. By deriv-
ing estimates of housing and transport burdens, Polacchini and Orfeuil (1999), Berri (2007) and Cou-
lombel and Leurent (2013) bring first pieces of answer for the Greater Paris Region. The three works 
draw similar conclusions:
• The housing burden is relatively stable throughout the metropolitan area and close to the maxi-
mum allowed. Polacchini and Orfeuil (1999) find that homebuyers bore in 1991 an average 
front ratio of 32%, against 26% for private sector tenants. For the same categories, Coulombel 
and Leurent (2013) find respectively 28% and 39% for year 2001. Berri (2007) provides the 
lowest estimates with 28% and 22% for year 1994.
• Conversely, the transport burden rises steadily with distance to the Central Business District 
(CBD). This stems from a greater car mode share in the suburbs, added to longer commuting 
trips. In 2001, expense ratios ranged from 7% in inner Paris to 21% in the most remote parts 
of the Greater Paris Region (Coulombel & Leurent, 2013).
All in all, all works point up a steady increase of the joint housing plus transport burden with 
distance to CBD. Quite remarkably, Haas, Makarewicz, Benedict, Sanchez, and Dawkins (2006) reach 
similar conclusions for the U.S., despite notorious differences with Europe relatively to common urban 
forms. Analyzing 28 metropolitan areas, they find the housing burden to be significantly less sensitive 
to location than the transport burden, which strongly increases with distance to the nearest job center. 
For households with yearly gross income ranging from $35,000 to $50,000, the mean housing burden 
varies between 23% and 26% depending on the location within the metropolitan area, against 16% to 
26% for transportation.
The above findings lead us to two statements. The fact that the housing expense ratio is both fairly 
stable over the metropolitan area and close to the maximum authorized is likely linked to the limitation 
of the front ratio, that is, to the CH policy. Housing burdens strongly vary across households (Coulom-
bel & Leurent, 2013). Thus, an average housing burden close to the upper bound most likely implies 
that a sizable number of households are constrained. Furthermore, having a front ratio below the cap 
does not mean that you were not constrained at the time of choosing your current home.4 In other 
words, the number of households with housing burdens at or above the theoretical cap is probably a 
lower bound of the number of households concerned by the CH policy.5 
Second, given the relative constancy of the housing burden, the rise of the transport burden with 
distance to CBD jeopardizes the solvency of suburban and exurban households. Households dedicating 
more than half their income to housing and transport are indeed no longer uncommon. Still, sound 
economic reasoning would object that rational and perfectly informed households choose the housing– 
transportation bundle that is best suited to them. Suburban households would then willingly bear high 
housing plus transport burdens, even it were to outweigh half their income. At least three arguments 
challenge this rationale:
4 Income usually rises along the household lifecycle until retirement. As nominal mortgage payments are usually held constant 
over time, this means that the housing burden gradually declines. And when the household has reimbursed its mortgage, its 
housing burden decreases even further. Because rent increases are regulated, similar phenomena occur on the rental market. As 
a result, a household usually sees its housing burden decrease until its next residential move. The housing burden may increase 
in some instances however, such as in the case of an adverse event on the job market (e.g., unemployment spell), or if housing 
expenses increase due to particular conditions (renegotiation of the lease, flexible interest rate mortgage products, etc.).
5 The housing burden may exceed the allowed limit for some households as the CH policy is not enforced dynamically, but in 
a static fashion (the capping is only checked once at the time of the residential choice).
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• In presence of sticky prices,6 households already settled in the city center (the “insiders”) might 
stay to benefit from low transport costs, pushing new households (the “outsiders”) towards the 
suburbs. The latter would enjoy lower housing prices, but that would still not compensate for 
the extra transport costs. Stickiness would slow the upward adjustment of housing prices in the 
central parts of the city, making insiders better off than outsiders.
• Households might not be perfectly informed of transport costs. In the case of car-owners, the 
coexistence of fixed and variable costs, the issue of maintenance, credit costs, etc., are all ele-
ments that blur the cost of car ownership. Besides, many households do not consider fixed costs 
in the equation. They take the fact that they need one, two or even three cars for granted, and 
compare the cost of transit to the variable cost of private transportation. Withal, they could save 
on one less car were they to locate in transit-friendly areas. Lastly, the volatility of fuel prices 
might be misunderstood or poorly taken into account.
• A last argument relying on moral hazard would raise the fact that households might insuf-
ficiently protect themselves against bankruptcy (from a social welfare point of view) because of 
laws and public policies protecting financially distressed households.
2.2 Survey of the economic literature on CH and CH+T policies
While there is little work regarding the regulation of housing expenses on the rental market,7 the effects 
of borrowing constraints on housing demand have largely been documented by the economic literature 
(see the review by Gobillon, 2008). Most works on this topic focus on the household decision to move 
and on the subsequent choice of tenure. Because borrowing constraints may prevent households from 
choosing their optimal value of housing stock, they have the twofold impact of making tenancy more at-
tractive and hindering residential mobility. The latter effect would even prevail according to Zorn (1989) 
and Gobillon and le Blanc (2008).
This literature has shed light on households’ residential choices under borrowing constraints, and 
emphasized the significant effects of CH policies on homeownership markets. Most works suffer from 
two limitations, however. The housing supply side and subsequently equilibrium mechanisms are sel-
dom considered, including the effect of borrowing constraints on real estate prices. Similarly, the issue 
of location space is rarely addressed in these works, including the few that specifically study CH+T poli-
cies (e.g., Blackman & Krupnick, 2001). Because housing prices strongly vary within the metropolitan 
area, borrowing constraints are bound to alter households’ location choices. According to Hare (1995), 
“clunker mortgages” would even be central in accounting for urban sprawl. 
2.3 Theoretical framework: The monocentric model
Based on the above considerations, fully understanding the effects of CH and CH+T policies involves 
considering the role of location as well as of equilibrium mechanisms. The canonic model of urban 
economics, namely the monocentric model, is therefore a prime candidate. Several forms of regulation 
including restrictions on city size, lot size, and density (or alternatively building-height via the Floor Area 
Ratio) have been extensively studied in its light.8 The integrated treatment of both the demand and sup-
ply side of the housing market within a spatial framework makes it a powerful tool to analyze land-use 
policies. Accordingly, we will use the monocentric model to investigate the effects of CH and CH+T 
policies, and now outline its main features.9
6 The rules of numerous countries regarding rent increases strongly back the assumption of sticky prices. In France a typical 
lease lasts three years. Landlords cannot “freely” adjust their rents outside these time intervals, and often incur transaction costs 
when doing so (because it typically implies a change of tenant).
7Let us stress that regulation of housing expenses is different from rent control. The former operates at the household level, 
conversely to the latter which is enforced at the dwelling level through rental price ceilings and for which a vast literature exists.
8 Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) and Brueckner (2009) afford a good overview of this literature.
9 See Fujita (1989) for a thoroughgoing presentation of the monocentric model.
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In the standard version of the monocentric model, N households work in the Central Business 
District (CBD), which is represented by a point in the center of the metropolitan area. They all earn 
the same income Y. The monocentric model aims to analyze the location choices of households within 
the metropolitan area, and their effects on housing supply and prices. Households maximize a utility 
function U(z,s), where s represents land consumption or lot size, and z the consumption of a composite 
good which synthesizes all other goods in the economy. The z good is taken as the numéraire, leading to 
the following utility maximization problem:
   maxU(z,s)   s.t.R(r)s+z+T(r)=Y,
where the variable r represents location, R(r) the relative land rent, and T(r) transport costs. Considering 
that settling far from the CBD entails high transport costs, households make a trade-off between acces-
sibility and housing prices when choosing their location.10 The crux of the model lies in the endogeneity 
of housing prices, reflecting the laws of supply and demand. At equilibrium, housing prices measure the 
spatial comparative advantage of a given location, and therefore decrease with distance to CBD.
3 Capping the housing expense ratio
We now amend the monocentric model to study the effects of CH policies. We consider the standard 
monocentric model of a closed city with absentee landlords and inelastic land supply. There are N house-
holds who share the same income Y and utility function U(z,s). The utility function U(z,s) and transport 
cost function T(r) satisfy the basic assumptions:
• U(z, s) is concave, strictly increases with z and s, and is well behaved.11 
• T(r) increases with distance r to the CBD.
As usual, we assume strictly positive land supply: ∀r >0,L(r)>0.
3.1 The capped housing expense ratio (CH) model
3.1.1  Model overview
CH policies consist in capping the ratio of housing expenses over the household gross income.12 Accord-
ingly, we add the following constraint to the household utility maximization problem:
   R(r)s≤(1-α)Y.     (1)
The parameter α, with 0≤α≤1, measures the solvency requirement level: it is the minimum income 
share that must be left after meeting housing expenses. The case α=0 is equivalent to the unconstrained 
monocentric model, and corresponds to the unregulated situation. Conversely, if α=1 corresponds to 
the opposite polar case: the solvency requirement is such that it leads to a null housing expense for all 
households.
Using the household budget constraint, (1) is equivalent to:
   z≥ αY-T(r).     (2)
z,s,r
10 For ease of understanding, we will often favor the term “housing prices” to “land rent” in general discussions. The mono-
centric model assumes the rental and property markets to be at equilibrium, so that prices and rents are essentially one and the 
same. Moreover, we will see in Section 5 that considering housing consumption instead of land consumption does not change 
our main findings, supporting this conflation of the two notions. 
11 See definition provided in Fujita (1989) p.99.
12 To keep the model simple, potential housing benefits and mortgage deductibility are not considered here. As expected, 
preliminary analyses show they raise the gross amount that a household can spend on housing, but do not change our main 
findings. See Fujita (1989) a detailed analysis of the effects of these measures.
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The household utility maximization problem can be rewritten:
   maxU(z,s)   s.t.
We introduce several notations. The farthest feasible location is noted rmax, with T(rmax )=Y. By not-
ing z(r,u) the solution of the bid-max problem for the unconstrained case (see below), we define two 
specific subsets of [0,rmax]:
• EA (u,α)={r / z(r,u)< αY-T(r)} is the strictly binding zone for a given utility level u and a given 
constraint level α. It is the set of locations where households effectively limit their housing con-
sumption because of the CH policy.
• EI (u,α)=EA (u,α)  is the complementary of EA (u,α). It is the nonbinding zone, where house-
holds are not affected by the CH policy. The open subset of EI (u,α) is noted EI(u,α).
Last, a tilde is added to the variable names when referring to the CH model, in contrast to the 
original unconstrained model for which no tilde is used.
3.1.2  The bid-max problem
Following Fujita (1989), the bid-rent function is defined as the maximum land rent per surface unit that 
a household can offer at location r given a target utility u:
  Ψ(r,u)=max  Y-T(r)-z   U(z,s)=u   .
The argmax of the bid-max problem are noted (z(r,u),s(r,u)) in the unconstrained case and (z (r,u),s 
(r,u)) in the CH case. We have three main results in the former case (Fujita, 1989): 1) lot size s(r,u) in-
creases with distance r to CBD and utility u, 2) bid rent Ψ(r,u) decreases with r and u, and finally 3) the 
consumption of the composite good z(r,u) decreases with r.13 Let S(z,u) and Z(s,u) denote the inverse 
functions of U(z,s) with regard to s and z.
Lemma 1
In the CH model, the bid-max variables are given by:
 
 z (r,u)=max[z(r,u),   αY-T(r)]
 s (r,u)=min[s(r,u),  S(αY-T(r),u)]    (3)
 Ψ (r,u)=min[Ψ(r,u),  (1-α)Y/s (r,u)] 
Proof
See Appendix. 
Lemma 1 implies that z (r,u) ≥z(r,u), s (r,u) ≤s(r,u) and Ψ (r,u)≤ Ψ(r,u). Capping the housing ex-
pense ratio reduces the demanded lot size and the ability to pay per unit of land.14 Moreover, (3) entails 
that:
• s (r,u,α) increases with r and u, and decreases with α;
•  Ψ (r,u,α) decreases with r, u, and α;
• z (r,u,α) decreases with r and increases with α.
Conservation of variational properties with respect to r and u will later prove central when demon-
strating the existence and uniqueness of the land use equilibrium in the CH model. Regarding the role 
of α, raising the constraint lowers the maximum level of housing expenses, which pushes households to 
z,s,r z≥ αY-T(r)

~
z,s          s            z ≥ αY-T(r)
~         ~
~
~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~
~
~
13 There is no specific result regarding the influence of u on z(r,u).
14 This is for a given utility level. Because the CH constraint entails changes in the equilibrium utility level, we will see that CH 
policies may actually lead to larger lots than in the unconstrained city. 
R(r)s+z+T(r)=Y,{
{ }
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purchase smaller lots, to decrease their bid rent, and to increase their consumption of the z good.
3.1.3  Existence and uniqueness of the CH equilibrium
Following Fujita (1989), establishing the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the CH model 
is equivalent to proving that there exists a single couple (u,rf )  that satisfies:
 
 Ψ (rf ,u ) = RA    
 ∫0   n(r)  dr = N      (4)
The upper equation is the boundary condition that determines the edge rf of the city: at rf the bid 
rent function equates the opportunity cost of land RA. The lower equation represents the population 
constraint: integrating density n(r) within the city yields total population N. Density n(r) is obtained by 
dividing the available land supply by the land consumption per household: n(r)=L(r)/s (r,u ). 
Proposition 1
The CH model admits a unique equilibrium.
Proof
See Appendix.  
3.2 Comparative statics in the general case
We study the influence of the constraint parameter α on the main equilibrium features.
3.2.1  City size
As the solvency requirement becomes more stringent, the size of the city decreases:
Proposition 2
The size rf (α) of the CH city decreases with α.
Proof
See Appendix.
CH cities are always smaller than unregulated cities (given by α = 0), whatever the value of α. This 
is conform to intuition, inasmuch as the CH constraint reduces bid-max lot sizes.15 
3.2.2  Equilibrium utility  
Limiting the front-end ratio generates two opposite forces:
• because they are constrained in their choices, for a given land rent level households achieve a 
lower utility than in the unconstrained situation;
• but capping housing expenses has a downward effect on bid prices, and subsequently on equi-
librium land rents, which raises household utility (through an income effect).
Depending on the relative magnitude of the two forces, the CH city will have a greater or lower 
equilibrium utility than the unregulated city. Proposition 3 sheds light on this issue:
~ ~
~ ~ ~
rf
~
~ ~
~    ~
~
15This point was not trivial. The equilibrium utility of the CH city may for some values of α be greater than for the unregulated 
city, which usually involves a larger city size in the monocentric model. This means that the downward effect of the CH con-
straint on bid-max lot sizes always prevails on the utility effect.
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Proposition 3
Consider 0≤α1<α2≤1. If the household located at the edge of the α1 city spends less than (1- α2 )Y on 
housing, the equilibrium utility u(α2 ) of the α2 city is greater than u(α1 ).
Proof
See Appendix.
As long as the solvency requirement is not too stringent (i.e., that the household located at the city 
edge remains unconstrained), the equilibrium utility increases with α. By setting α1=0, Proposition 3 
also provides a sufficient (but not necessary) criterion for the CH city to display a greater equilibrium 
utility than the unregulated city. We will see in subsection 3.3 that if the constraint is too strong, the 
utility of the CH city falls and tends toward 0, however.
3.2.3  Household budget breakdown
The influence of α on housing expenses is not trivial, because tightening the constraint may yield a lower 
utility level, which may raise the housing budget of unconstrained households. When utility increases, 
raising α always decreases the total land rent accruing to landlords. This point holds true if the entire 
city is constrained (see Appendix).
3.3 Application to a linear city
Considering the limitations of the general case, we consider in the next two subsections the special case 
of a linear city L(r)=1 with linear transport costs T(r)=ar and of households with Cobb-Douglas pref-
erences U(z,s)=z1/2 s1/2. This will allow us to derive closed-form solutions and thereby elaborate on the 
effects of CH policies in the simplest possible manner.
3.3.1  Binding zone
Under Cobb-Douglas preferences, households allow fixed fractions of their disposable income to each 
budget item, in our case one half for housing and the other for the z composite good. Consequently, the 
housing budget in the unconstrained case is R(r)s(r,u)=1/2 (Y- ar), and the CH constraint (1) is strictly 
binding if and only if r < rbind (α)=(2α -1)Y /a, where  rbind (α) sets the end of the binding zone EA (u,α). 
This leads to two alternatives (Figure 1):
• if α≤1/2, the solvency constraint is loose and never binding; the CH model is equivalent to the 
unconstrained model.
• if α>1/2, households located before rbind (α) are subject to the CH constraint.
Figure 1:  Illustration of the binding zone for α≤1/2 and α>1/2
Note: the unconstrained housing budget is depicted in plain line, while the CH constraint appears in dashes.
~ ~
r
Housing 
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expense
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3.3.2  Bid-max variables
Solving the bid-max problem yields:
       z (r,u) = αY-ar
 r ≤ rbind(α)    s (r,u) = u2/z (r,u)
       Ψ (r,u) = (1-α)Y(αY-ar)/u²)
 
Figure 2A:  Lot size and z good consumption in the unconstrained (U) and CH models
Figure 2 illustrates the bid-max variables for the following parameter values: N=10, Y=80, a=8, and 
RA =20. The CH constraint and utility levels are set at α= 0.80 and u = 4.61, respectively.
16 For these 
settings, we have rmax  = 10 and rbind  = 6.
As shown in subsection 3.1.2, CH policies reduce lot sizes and bid rents within the binding zone, 
while increasing consumption of the composite good. Beyond the binding zone, we find the same solu-
tions for the CH and unconstrained models.17
Figure 2B:  Bid rent functions in the unconstrained (U) and CH models
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16The value u = 4.61 corresponds to the equilibrium utility level of the CH model for the chosen parameter values. The equi-
librium utility for the unconstrained model is u = 4 (see Figure 3). For our illustrations we use u = 4.61 in both cases, however. 
This aims to bring forward the distortive effect of the CH constraint on bid-max variables (for a given utility level), which is less 
conspicuous when adding the variation in utility (cf. subsection 3.2.20). 
17 Again, this is for similar utility levels. At equilibrium, the utility of the CH model may be greater or lower than for the un-
constrained model, with subsequent changes in the bid-max variables.
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3.3.3  Analytical derivation of the equilibrium land use
In the linear CH city, the equilibrium land use is given by (see proof in Appendix):
where αcr=√RA+2aN / (√RA +√RA+2aN ) is the threshold value of α above which the entire CH city 
is constrained. Calculations are based on the distinction of three regimes:
•  α ≤ 1/2 yields the unconstrained model;
• If 1/2 ≤ α ≤αcr , the city edge is beyond rbind(α), meaning that the most remote households are 
not impacted by the constraint;
• If α ≥ αcr all households are constrained.
3.4 Comparative statics in the linear city model
Using the results from subsection 3.3.3, we study the influence of the constraint level α on households 
(utility, budget composition) and land use (city size, density).
3.4.1  Equilibrium utility
In the linear city model, raising α increases household utility at first, but if the CH constraint is too 
stringent utility decreases (except in the special case RA=0).
Proposition 4
If RA > 0, the equilibrium utility u(α) in the linear CH city is first constant, strictly increases, and finally 
decreases, with u (α)   0.
If RA=0, the equilibrium utility u(α) is first constant then strictly increases.
Proof
See Appendix.
If outside competition for land (as measured by RA) is mild, the distorting effect of the CH con-
straint on households’ consumption choices is more than compensated for by lower land rents within 
the binding zone. This raises utility for all households. If the CH constraint causes the household com-
petitiveness to be too weak relatively to the agricultural sector however, the effect of a reduction in city 
size is accentuated and causes the decline in utility. 
Figure 3 illustrates the variations of u(α) in the case of our reference model. 18 
3.4.2  City size
Unlike utility, increasing α always reduces city size (Figure 3), as established by Proposition 2. The way 
it occurs varies depending on the value of α, however. If utility rises, higher densities near the CBD 
~
~
α    1-
~
18 For reminder the reference model corresponds to N=10, Y=80, a=8 and RA=20; for these settings αcr=0.75.
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overweigh lower densities in the suburban area, hence a smaller city (Figure 4). When utility decreas-
es—which is when the CH constraint is too strong relatively to the need to compete for land with the 
agricultural sector—density uniformly rises throughout the city, which causes city size to decrease ever 
more rapidly. All in all, CH policies lead to steeper density gradients throughout the city (Figure 4).
Figure 3:  Influence of α on equilibrium utility and city size
Figure 4:  Influence of α on equilibrium densities
3.4.3  Household budget breakdown
Because CH policies are intended to protect the solvency of households, one key issue lies in the average 
composition of the household budget at the equilibrium land use:
Proposition 5
In the linear city model, the average housing and transport burdens both decrease with α, entailing a 
higher consumption of the z good.
Proof
See Appendix.
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Figure 5 illustrates Proposition 5 for the reference model. For moderate values of α (between 0.5 
and 0.6), increasing α barely reduces housing and transport burdens, as only a limited fraction of house-
holds are affected by the constraint. As α increases further, housing expenses decrease more sharply while 
transport costs remain moderately affected. On this interval, decreasing α has a more significant down-
ward effect on prices than on lot sizes. Beyond a certain value (around α = 0.85), the constraint weighs 
more on households’ choices of lot size, resulting in a decrease in city size as well as in transport costs.
Figure 5:  Influence of α on the average composition of the household budget
4 Capping the joint housing plus transport expense ratio
We now consider the alternative prudential measure that caps the joint housing plus transport expense 
ratio. As previously, we study the effect of the policy on the equilibrium land use, with a specific atten-
tion to the influence of the constraint parameter µ.
Considering the strong similarities between the CH and CH+T models, we present the results in 
the general case while omitting proofs, to focus on the application to the linear city. More detailed results 
regarding the CH+T model may be found in Appendix. This time a hat is added to variable names when 
referring to the CH+T model.
4.1 The capped housing + transport (CH+T) expense ratio model
4.1.1 Model overview
Again, we amend the monocentric model by introducing the new constraint:
  R(r)s+T(r) ≤ (1-μ)Y  (5)
The sum of housing and transport expenses is capped at a fraction (1 - µ) of the household gross 
income. Equivalently, µ represents the minimum share of income that must remain for the sole con-
sumption of the z composite good. As a matter of fact, (5) is equivalent to:
  z ≥ μY    (6)
As previously, the case µ = 0 corresponds to the unconstrained model.
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CH+T policies generate effects similar to CH policies: they constrain household choices regarding 
lot size (they de facto set a minimum net density)19, and lower land prices by limiting the household 
bidding power. But unlike CH policies, they firstly affect remote households, starting from the city 
edge. The tighter the constraint, the more households are subject to it, until the whole city is effectively 
constrained.
4.1.2  Equilibrium features in the general case
Equilibrium for the CH+T model exists and is unique.20 As mentioned above, the CH+T constraint 
induces the same forces as in the CH case: it forces households to make sub-optimal choices, which 
decreases the equilibrium utility, but also leads to lowers land rents, which raises utility. Unlike for CH 
policies, there is no obvious case where one can predict the outcome regarding the utility level. The same 
holds true for housing expenses and total differential land rent. Therefore, the only specific property in 
the general case is that city size decreases with μ, which stems from the minimum net density enforce-
ment.21
4.2 Application to a linear city
We consider the same linear city model as in Section 3, with U(z,s)=z1/2 s1/2, T(r)=ar and L(r)=1.
4.2.1  Binding zone  
Following the same reasoning as in subsection 3.3.1, it is straightforward to show that the CH+T 
constraint (5) is strictly binding if and only if r > rbind (μ)=(1-2μ)Y/a, where rbind (μ) sets the beginning 
of the binding zone. Hence the two following possibilities:
• If µ ≤ 1/2, only households located beyond rbind (μ) are constrained. 
• If µ > 1/2, the entire city is constrained.
We define μcr as the first value of μ for which the CH+T constraint is effective (i.e., if μ<μcr no 
household is constrained and we are faced with the unconstrained model).
4.2.2  Bid-max variables
   z (r,u) = (Y - ar)/2    z (r,u)  =μY
 r≤rbind (μ) s (r,u) = u2/z (r,u)  r≤rbind (μ) s (r,u)  =u2/z (r,u)
   Ψ (r,u) = (Y - ar)²/4u²   Ψ (r,u)=μY((1-μ)Y - ar)/u²
Figure 6 illustrates the bid-max variables for the reference model.22 If r ≤ rbind (μ), the CH+T con-
straint is not binding and consumption choices are identical to the unconstrained model. If r > rbind (μ), 
the constraint leads to constant choices of lot size and of the z good.
^
^
^
~
~
~
~ ~
19 At equilibrium, all households share the same utility u(μ). The CH+T constraint z≥μY therefore implies that s ≤ S(μY,u(μ)). 
Lot size cannot exceed a certain value, which is equivalent to setting a minimum net density. See also Appendix for more details 
on this point.
20 Proof of Proposition 1 may be easily adapted to demonstrate this point.
21 Again, proof of Proposition 2 is easily adapted.
22 The reference model is characterized by the following parameter values: N=10, Y=80, a=8, RA=20. In addition, we set µ = 
0.30 and u = 4, hence rmax = 7 and rbind = 4. The value u = 4 corresponds to the equilibrium utility of the CH+T model for this 
specific set of parameters (and is coincidentally that of the unconstrained model
^ ^
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Figure 6A:  Lot size and z good consumption in the unconstrained (U) and CH+T models
Figure 6B:  Bid rent functions in the unconstrained (U) and CH+T models
4.2.3  Analytical derivation of the equilibrium land use
In the linear CH+T city, the equilibrium land use is given by (see proof in Appendix):
where 
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Again, calculations are based on the distinction of three cases:
•  μ ≤ μcr  yields the unconstrained model.
•  μcr≤μ≤1/2 is the intermediate case in which only households living in the central part of the 
city (i.e., [0,rbind  (μ)]) are unconstrained.
• If μ ≥1/2, rbind  (μ)≤0 and the entire city is constrained.
4.3 Comparative statics in the linear city model
4.3.1  Equilibrium utility
Straightforwardly, u (μ) is constant if μ ≤1/2, then strictly decreases. For μcr≤ μ≤1/2, the decrease in 
land rents exactly offsets the effect on lot sizes, hence a constant utility level. If μ ≥1/2, the constraint 
becomes too strong: the lot size effect prevails and utility falls.
Figure 7 plots u (μ) in the case of the reference model (with µcr = 0.224):
Figure 7:  Influence of µ on equilibrium utility and city size
4.3.2  City size
As mentioned in subsection 4.1.2, city size decreases with µ, whatever the parameter values. Starting 
from µcr (before, the constraint is innocuous), the effects of the CH+T policy are barely sizable at first, 
but quickly city size dwindles 
This shows the efficiency of this policy to curb urban sprawl (relatively to CH policies). If µ ≥ 1/2, 
city size decreases linearly.
Unlike CH policies, CH+T policies lead to more homogeneous densities across the city. Indeed, 
as mentioned previously CH policies de facto enforce a minimum net density level, which affects either 
only part of or the whole city depending on whether μ⋚1/2 (Figure 8). This accounts for the linearity 
of city size if µ ≥ 1/2.
^
^
0
2
4
6
8
0
1
2
3
4
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
C
I
T
Y
S
I
Z
E
U
T
I
L
I
T
Y
CONSTRAINT PARAMETER μ
CITY SIZE
UTILITY
UNCONSTRAINED MODERATE CONSTRAINT STRONG CONSTRAINT
642 JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT AND LAND USE 10.1
Figure 8:  Influence of μ on equilibrium densities
4.3.3  Household budget breakdown
Similarly to CH policies, CH+T policies reduce both households’ housing and transport outlays (which 
is indeed the very goal of these policies):
Proposition 6
In the linear city model, the average housing and transport burdens both decrease with µ, hence an in-
creasing mean consumption of the composite good.
Proof
See Appendix.
When the CH+T policy becomes active (i.e., µ ≥ µcr), raising µ results in lower transport costs as 
well as housing expenses. The two items decrease in similar proportions this time, due to the joint con-
sideration of housing and transport instead of housing only within the budget constraint. If µ > 1/2, the 
constraint gets too strong, and the decrease steepens.
Figure 9:  Influence of μ on the average composition of the household budget
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
D
E
N
S
I
T
Y
DISTANCE TO CBD R
CH+T (µ=0.6)
CH+T (µ=0.3)
CH+T (µ=0.4)
Unconstrained
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
CONSTRAINT PARAMETER μ
z consumption
Transport costs
Housing expenses
643Prudential measures in housing access
5 Extension: Elastic housing supply
In the previous sections, we have considered the simplest version of the monocentric model, in which 
households directly consume land (rather than housing) and land supply is inelastic. 
We have seen in Sections 3 and 4 that CH and CH+T measures lead to lower housing prices. One 
would expect real estate developers to react accordingly by reducing housing supply, a retroactive effect 
which is not captured by the “land version” of the monocentric model. This could change our findings 
inasmuch as lower housing supply is detrimental to households; in particular, it might reduce or even 
offset the utility gain observed in the CH case. To address this issue, we extend the CH and CH+T 
models developed in Sections 3 and 4 by considering elastic housing supply (which also involves that 
households consume housing services instead of land as previously). Then, we illustrate to what extent 
this changes our findings in the case of our reference linear city model. 
Following Muth (1969), we represent the housing industry as perfectly competitive and as being 
characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function: H(K,L)=H0 K
ϵ L1-ϵ. Firms use L units of land and 
K units of capital to produce H(K,L) units of housing services. The parameter ϵ measures the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and land, while H0 is a model constant. Considering that the land rent is 
given by RL (r) and the cost of capital is δ, the profit function of real estate developers reads: Π(K,L)=RH 
(r)H(K,L) - RL (r)L - δK, where RH (r) is the unit price (or unit rent to be specific) of housing services at 
location r. Firms being profit-maximizers, the optimal level of capital K* is given by:
        (7)
The optimal level of housing services at location r is thus 
Built density H(K*,L)/L increases with housing price RH (r) with an elasticity ϵ/(1 - ϵ)>0. This 
conforms to the stylized fact that the higher the level of housing prices, the higher the built density at a 
given location. 
To emphasize the fact that households now consume housing services instead of land, their utility 
is written U(z,q), where q measures the consumption level of housing services. Similarly, the population 
density n(r) used in the equilibrium condition relative to the population constraint (lower equation in 
(4)) is now given by n(r)=H(K* (r),L(r))/q(r,u) instead of n(r)=L(r)/s(r,u) as in Sections 3 and 4.
Representing the housing industry makes the algebra substantially more complex. Formal deriva-
tion of the linear case in particular is no longer feasible. Given these limitations, we illustrate the effect of 
elastic housing supply by studying the influence of the parameter ϵ, the elasticity of substitution between 
land and capital (which also measures the price elasticity of housing supply), on the equilibrium solution 
in the case of our reference linear city model. 
As expected, elastic housing supply mitigates the welfare effects (positive or negative) of CH and 
CH+T prudential measures. Let us consider the CH case. If housing supply is inelastic (ϵ=0)—as as-
sumed in Sections 3 and 4—the maximum utility gain is around 15% (Figure 10). But as housing 
supply gets more elastic the maximum gain falls to around 3% for ϵ=0.25 and is null for ϵ=0.5. The 
decrease in housing prices caused by the CH policy entails a downward adjustment of housing supply. 
The lower supply mitigates the welfare improving income effect of the CH policy, and may even cancel 
it if the price elasticity of housing supply is too great. The opposite occurs for CH+T policies: though 
barely discernable on Figure 10, the housing industry does (very) slightly mitigate the decrease in utility 
caused by the CH+T policy.
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Figure 10:  Influence of μ on equilibrium utility
Note: Utility levels are provided in relative terms. This aims to make the comparison between the different values of ϵ easier, as 
the starting point of each curve (the equilibrium utility in the unconstrained case) would vary with the value of ϵ, otherwise. 
The above curves therefore measure the relative gain/loss in utility compared to the unconstrained situation as a function of the 
constraint parameter α (CH case) or μ (CH+T case).
The influence on city size is less trivial. In the CH case, an increase in ϵ exacerbates the decrease in 
city size, while the opposite occurs in the CH+T case (Figure 11). Elastic housing supply leads to higher 
built densities near the CBD, and to lower built densities in the suburbs. Compared to the inelastic case, 
there is consequently more population living close to the CBD. In the CH case, reduction in city size 
primarily stems from the lower housing consumption of households close to the CBD (see 3.4.2). The 
effect is accentuated with elastic housing supply, as more households live near the CBD and are forced 
to decrease their housing consumption. In the CH+T case, reduction in city size is mainly the fact of 
suburban households (see 4.2.2). Because the latter are less numerous when housing supply is elastic, the 
impact on city size is mitigated this time.
Figure 11:  Influence of ϵ on equilibrium city size
Note: Again, city sizes are provided in relative terms (compared to the unconstrained situation).
0
0,25
0,5
0,75
1
1,25
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
CH case
ε = 0 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.5
 𝑢𝑢 𝛼𝛼 / 𝑢𝑢 0
 0
0,25
0,5
0,75
1
1,25
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
CH+T case 𝑢𝑢 𝜇𝜇 / 𝑢𝑢 0

0
0,25
0,5
0,75
1
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
CH case
ε = 0 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.5
 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 𝛼𝛼 / 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 0
 0
0,25
0,5
0,75
1
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
CH+T case 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 𝛼𝛼 / 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 0

645Prudential measures in housing access
6 Application to the Greater Paris Region
We now briefly investigate the case of the Greater Paris Region. Rather than precise figures, which would 
imply using a much more sophisticated model, this short numerical application intends to provide a first 
appraisal of the effects of CH and CH+T policies in a real case study. The study area of the Greater Paris 
Region is especially relevant in this regard. As discussed in subsection 2.1, housing is very expensive, 
in particular in the central parts of the metropolitan area and firstly Paris. Similarly, transport costs in 
suburban areas are high, due to an extensive use of the car. CH and CH+T prudential measures are thus 
likely to yield significant effects. Moreover, employment remains strongly localized around the CBD of 
Paris and La Défense, meaning that the monocentric assumption is valid to some extent (Viguié, Hal-
legatte, & Rozenberg, 2014).
We utilize for the numerical application the extended model developed in Section 5. Parameter val-
ues were extracted from a number of sources and correspond to year 2008. Household population and 
gross income are provided by Census and fiscal databases from Insee (French national institute for statis-
tics), respectively. Transport costs were extracted from Coulombel and Leurent (2013).23 All remaining 
parameters (household utility function, housing production function, cost of capital) were borrowed 
from Viguié et al. (2014).24 Parameter values are as follows: N = 4 863 000, Y = 3 000€, U(z,s)=z0.6 s0.4, 
T(r)=0.014 r,  L(r)=2πθ(r)r with θ(r)=0.5e-r/7000, RA = 12 €/m², H(K,L)=2.014 K
0.36 s0.64 and last δ = 5%. 
We first investigate the effects of CH and CH+T policies on household solvency. Solvency is mea-
sured as the fraction of the household (gross) income that remains after meeting housing and transport 
expenses, which are treated as compulsory.26 For both policies, increasing the constraint parameter im-
proves household solvency (Figure 12). CH+T policies reduce inequalities between households much 
more strongly than CH policies do, however. By jointly considering housing and transport instead of 
housing only, CH+T policies ultimately prove more efficient than CH policies in improving household 
solvency as a whole.
Figure 12:  Influence of CH and CH+T constraint levels on household solvency (Greater Paris Region)
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23 The authors compute the mean transport burden for a subdivision in 8 zones of the Greater Paris Region. Transport costs 
include fixed and variable costs for car users, purchase of passes and tickets for transit users, as well as potential benefits and 
tax reductions. A linear regression was performed on their results to produce the specification of T(r) used in this application. 
24 The authors have successfully calibrated and applied a monocentric model to study energy transition scenarios for the Greater 
Paris Region, which makes their paper an ideal source for our application.
25 Viguié et al. (2014) use a slightly different boundary condition from usual: RA corresponds to the boundary housing rent level 
(i.e. the reservation housing rent below which real estate developers choose not to build) instead of the boundary land rent level. 
We use the same definition of RA in our application.
26 Formally, household solvency at location r is given by Ω(r)=(Y - R(r)s - T(r))/Y=z/Y. The minimum, mean and maximum 
values are then derived by considering the whole household population across the city. For instance, the mean solvency is equal 
to Ω =∫0  Ω (r)n(r)dr/N.–    rf
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We now wish to compare the effects of CH and CH+T policies on utility and city size. The param-
eters α and μ are not directly comparable, however, as the scope of the budget constraint differs in each 
case: housing for the former, housing plus transport for the latter. We will use the mean solvency level 
instead to proxy the constraint level. It is an indicator that is in both cases directly related to the con-
straint stringency and comparable across policies. To illustrate, a mean solvency level of 70% is achieved 
through a value of α = 0.76 and μ = 0.7 (Figure 12). 
For a same mean solvency level, the CH prudential measure always leads in the case of the Greater 
Paris Region to a greater utility level than the CH+T prudential measure. Remarkably, both policies 
(and not only the CH policy) improve household utility for low to moderate constraint levels. Cur-
rently, a CH policy is enforced in the Greater Paris Region at a constraint level of α = 0.66, which 
corresponds to a mean solvency level of 59.7% (Figure 12). For this target solvency level, equilibrium 
utility is equal to 471.91 in the CH case and 468.45 in the CH+T case (Figure 13), against 460.6 in 
the unconstrained situation. This corresponds to an equivalent variation in income of 85€ (+2.8%) and 
58€ (+1.9%), respectively.
Conversely, while both policies do curb urban sprawl, the effect is always greater in the case of the 
CH+T policy. For a mean solvency level of 59.7% city size is 35.7 km (-11%) in the CH case and only 
25 km (-38%) in the CH+T case, against 40 km in the unconstrained case. All values are smaller than 
the actual size of the Greater Paris Region, which is roughly 60 km. The underestimation of the size of 
the Greater Paris Region in our model may be explained by a combination of factors, starting from the 
fact that we consider neither protected areas nor leap-frog development. Still, it suggests that changing 
the current CH policy with a CH+T policy at a similar level (with respect to the target solvency level) 
would strongly curb urban sprawl, with most likely (strongly) positive environmental impacts.
Figure 13:  Effect of CH and CH+T policies on equilibrium utility and city size (Greater Paris Region)
Note: Equilibrium utility and city size are represented as a function of the mean solvency level (see discussion above).
7 Discussion
We have shown that both prudential measures—namely capping either the housing expense ratio or 
the joint housing plus transport expense ratio—have two main effects: 1) they distort households’ resi-
dential choices and reduce housing consumption, and 2) they lower housing prices by limiting the 
household bidding capacity. In as much as housing supply is price elastic, the decrease in housing prices 
also leads to lower construction. 
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Regarding household welfare, the distortions of housing supply and demand both tend to decrease 
utility, while the lower housing prices tend to raise it. The relative magnitude of these effects depends on 
the constraint level (among other things), hence contrasted results. Provided that the price elasticity of 
housing supply is not too high, we find that CH policies improve household utility for low to moderate 
constraint levels. In the case of CH+T policies, the utility gain is smaller than for CH policies, if not 
null.27 Indeed, CH policies, as they only consider housing, have a stronger downward effect on housing 
prices than CH+T policies do. If the constraint is too stringent, CH and CH+T policies are both welfare 
worsening.28
Of course, the increase in utility—when it occurs—has a cost: It lowers the total housing expen-
diture accruing to landlords. By decreasing rental prices, CH and CH+T policies proceed to a form of 
redistribution from landlords to households similar to the public ownership case, where land rents are 
redistributed to households (Fujita, 1989).29
Regarding land use effects, CH and CH+T policies both lead to smaller cities than when there is no 
market regulation through the combined reduction of housing demand and supply. While this tends to 
invalidate the claim that CH policies foster urban sprawl, CH+T policies do reduce city size more. This 
is relatively intuitive, since CH+T policies drive households toward central locations (with low housing 
plus transport burdens), while CH policies do the opposite. Additionally, CH+T policies lead to more 
homogeneous densities throughout the city, whereas CH policies tend to steepen the density gradient.
Finally, CH+T policies improve household solvency more efficiently than CH policies. The former 
(intrinsically) tend to equalize housing plus transport burdens across the city and thus decrease inequali-
ties between households. Conversely, CH policies firstly target by design households living close to the 
city center, who face high housing burdens but low housing plus transport burdens (in comparison to 
suburban households). As a result, CH policies do improve household solvency on average, but tend to 
maintain if not increase inequalities between the households close to and distant from the CBD.
Our results are subject to a number of caveats. First, the effects of CH and CH+T policies may vary 
depending on the constraint level and the characteristics of demand and supply. Accordingly, one should 
ultimately resort to numerical simulation, like in Section 6, to appraise the effects of these policies in 
real case studies. Ultimately, more sophisticated models such as integrated transport land use models 
(ITLUMs) would be required to provide very fine estimates of the policy effects, as well as account for 
non-trivial phenomena (disequilibrium, suboptimal households’ behaviors in residential choice because 
of tight housing market, etc.) . This falls outside the scope of the present paper, however.
Second, transport costs are represented in a simple manner: the function T(r) is the average trans-
port budget (net of potential benefits and tax reductions), all modes considered, that a household spends 
on daily travel by settling at location r. In this sense, car ownership and mode choice decisions are 
already synthesized within the T(r) function to some extent. Transit-friendly areas correspond to low 
values of T(r), and conversely for car-dependent suburban areas. The assumption of a single synthetic 
mode is not problematic, consequently, insofar as location is a key determinant of transport costs.
Last, we have considered homogeneous households to limit model complexity. Household income 
is a key determinant of housing demand, however. Housing expense ratios markedly decrease with gross 
income (Coulombel & Leurent, 2013; Haas et al., 2006), meaning that low-income households are 
more likely to be affected by CH and CH+T policies. In light of our findings, it is therefore likely that 
high income households will benefit more from the reduction in housing prices and of any possible 
welfare gains, hence equity issues. To a lesser extent, household structure is another important deter-
27 More specifically, the utility gain is always null in the linear city model. It may be positive in some instances, such as when 
land supply quickly decreases with distance to CBD (like in our application to the Paris area).
28 The only exception is the case RA = 0 (no outside competition for land), which is little realistic...
29 Given the analysis of the Herbert-Stevens model, utility of the closed-city model is maximized in the case of public ownership 
(Fujita, 1989). No other configuration of the city, including CH and CH+T cities, can outperform this one in utility grounds. 
Yet, CH policies are widely enforced and accepted, while such is not the case for the public ownership of land.
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minant of housing demand, as well as of transport demand. Large families, due to their larger housing 
and transport needs, are more likely to be impacted to CH and CH+T policies, while single person 
or DINK (Dual income no kids) households are more likely to leverage the benefits of lower housing 
prices.30 An ongoing work is aiming to extend the model to several household classes (including income 
and household size) to further investigate this issue. 
Regarding public policy implications, the results of our numerical application to the Greater Paris 
Region clearly call for a policy change. Replacing the current prudential measure, based on a CH type 
design, with a CH+T type design would greatly improve household solvency (by reducing inequalities) 
and substantially curb urban sprawl (with a predicted 27% reduction in city size), for an otherwise neg-
ligible welfare loss (predicted of -1% in equivalent income). Our analysis has also shown CH+T policies 
(and CH policies to a lesser extent) to be better solvency policies than another widely enforced policy, 
namely housing subsidies. Indeed, they lead to lower housing prices, while housing subsidies have the 
unintended effect of raising housing prices, thereby strongly mitigating the solvency effect of the mea-
sure (Fack, 2005). One remaining issue is how to operationalize this CH+T prudential rule. As a matter 
of fact, one advantage of CH policies is that they are easily enforced: all elements required to compute 
the prudential ratio (i.e., household gross income and rent or monthly mortgage instalment) are avail-
able by the time of the housing choice.While such is not the case for transport costs, tools have been 
developed to help determine one’s prospective transport costs depending on the location choice.31 Using 
such tools or simple rules based on the future commuting distance and mean kilometric costs, one may 
get an estimate of transport costs to be included within the prudential calculation. The CH+T design 
could then be implemented either as a hard rule (i.e., as a maximum housing plus transport ratio) or as 
an incentive measure (e.g., by raising home loan size in central or transit-friendly areas).32
8 Acknowledgments
This research was funded by the Fondation pour les Sciences Sociales, under the aegis of the Fondation de 
France. I would like to address my thanks to François Héran, its scientific head, and to the laureates of 
the 2ème Journée pour les Sciences Sociales, who greatly contributed to improving this work. I would also 
like to address special acknowledgments to Marjorie Raimond, Fabien Leurent, Andrew Byrd, Harris 
Selod and Thomas Piketty for providing helpful support and comments for this paper.
30 Divorced families are especially likely to face adverse effects, as they combine high housing needs (in particular in the case of 
shared custody) to lower incomes than non-divorced families.
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Appendix
9 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
There are two possibilities. If z(r,u)≥αY - T(r), the constraint is not binding. The solution of the 
bid-max problem for the CH case is the same as for the unconstrained case, hence: z(r,u)=z(r,u), s 
(r,u)=s(r,u) and Ψ (r,u)=Ψ(r,u). 
If z(r,u) < αY - T(r), the CH constraint (2) is binding and we have z (r,u)≥αY - T(r), s (r,u)=S(αY 
- T(r),u) and Ψ (r,u)=(1 - α)Y/s (r,u).
The two alternatives can be combined as follows: z(r,u)=max[z(r,u),αY-T(r)], s (r,u) =min [s(r,u), 
S(αY - T(r),u)] and Ψ (r,u)=min[Ψ(r,u),(1 - α)Y/ s (r,u)].     
Proof of Proposition 1
In line with Fujita (1989), we consider the outer boundary function b (u) defined by:
The function b (u) determines the city size needed to accommodate the population of size N for a 
given target utility u. Because s (r,u) possesses the same required features as s(r,u), namely s (r,u) decreases 
with u, tends toward +∞ when u ⃗ +∞ and toward 0 when u ⃗ 0, one could proceed similarly to Fujita 
and show that b (u) is defined on an interval [0,a[ , with possibly a=+∞. Furthermore, b (u) strictly in-
creases with u, and ranges from 0 to +∞ when u ranges from 0 to a. 
Then, consider the function R Bound (x)=Ψ (x,U (x)) where U (x)=b
-1 (x)  for xϵ[0,rmax [. R Bound (x) 
is the land rent at the edge x of a city the utility of which is chosen so as to yield the required city size 
x. Because b (u) increases strictly with u, so does U (x), entailing that R Bound (x) is strictly decreasing in 
x (remember that Ψ (r,u) decreases with both r and u). Since R Bound (rmax )=0 and R Bound (x)  ⃗  +∞, the 
equation R Bound (x)=RA admits one and only one solution  r f. Finally, by taking u =U =(r f ), it is trivial to 
check that (u ,r f ) satisfy the condition (4).
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider 0≤α1<α2≤1. First, we show that the constrained boundary rent curve R Bound (x,α1 ) is 
above the second one: R Bound (x,α1 )≥R Bound (x,α2 ). As ∀(r,u), s (r,u,α1 )≥ s (r,u,α2 ), then 
             =N entails b (u,α1 )≥b (u,α2 ), which in turn implies that the 
inverse functions are in reversed order, that is to say U(x,α1 )≤U(x,α2 ). 
Using the inequality ∀(r,u), Ψ (r,u,α1 )≥Ψ (r,u,α2 ), we have:
which is the claimed property. Considering this, Proposition 2 is straightforward as R Bound (r f 
(α1 ),α1 )≤R Bound (r f (α2 ),α2 )=RA. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us consider a household located at r f (α1 ). If the household spends less than α2 Y on housing 
in the α1 city, this implies that r f (α1 )ϵE A (u (α1 ),α2 ). We then have the following relationships:
~ ~
~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~
~
~ ~
~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~
x⃗0+
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~
~
~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~
~
_
~
~
~
~
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Combining all these relationships yields      
which finally implies u(α2 )≥u(α1 ).   
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume first RA>0. Continuity of u(α) is ensured on each solution interval as all formulations are 
continuous functions. Continuity in α=αcr is easily verified. If α=1, α Ψ(r,u)=0, hence u (1)=0 given 
that RA>0. One can show u (α)  ⃗  0, so in this sense u (α) is continuous on [1/2,1]. 
Moreover, according to the results from subsection 3.3.3:
The function u (α) strictly increases on [1/2,αcr], where αcrϵ]1/2;1[. Because u (α) is continuous on 
[1/2,1], there exists αmax  ≥αcr with u(αmax )≥u(αcr )>u
*. 
Showing αmax>αcr is not straightforward, because determining the sign of ∂x (α)/∂α is not trivial. 
However, one can show that ∂x (α)/∂α>0 in α=αcr, by deriving the system satisfied by x (α) on [αcr,1], 
which is RA
2/(1 - α)² Y²x ²+2aNx - α²Y²=0. From there, substituting αcr by its value does the deal.
Next, consider the special case RA=0. When the opportunity cost of the land is null, the edge of 
the city is always located at rmax=Y/a, which is the farthest feasible location. Considering the definition 
of αcr, αcr=0. Then    holds true on [1/2,1[, and is maximal when α tends toward 1, with 
the following limit:   
Since no equilibrium occurs when α=1, the exact maximum cannot be reached through a decen-
tralized equilibrium.  
10 Additional results for the CH model
Analyzing the influence of α on housing expenses proves complex because raising α may lower the equi-
librium utility, thereby possibly increasing unconstrained households’ housing costs. Notwithstanding, 
0 indicates two cases when raising α decreases the aggregate housing expenditure (=land rent), as well as 
the total differential land rent (TDR).
For reminder, the TDR is the sum of households’ housing expenses, to which has been deducted 
the opportunity cost of land:
Proposition A
For any couple α1<α2 satisfying u (α1 )≤u (α2 ), the overall amount H(α1) of housing expenses within 
the α1 city is greater than H(α2). Similarly, TDR(α1) ≥ TDR(α2).
Otherwise, if the α1 city is entirely constrained, H(α1)> H(α2).
Proof
Let us start with the first case. The inequality u (α1 )≤u (α2 ) implies that Ψ(r,u (α1 ),α1 )≥Ψ (r,u 
(α2 ),α2 ) for any r sinceΨ (r,u,α) decreases with both u and α. Moreover, r f (α1 )≥r f (α2 ) (Proposition 
2), hence:
~ ~
~
~ ~
~
α⃗1-
~
~ ~
~ ~
~
~ ~
~
~ ~
~ ~ ~~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~
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Considering that Ψ (r,α1 ) - RA≥Ψ (r,α2 ) - RA, we also have TDR(α1 )≥TDR(α2 ).
In the second case, corresponding to [0,r f (α1 )[ϵEA (u (α1 ),α1 ), all households are constrained 
in the α1 city, and thus in the α2 city likewise. This entails H(αi)=N.(1-αi)Y for i=(1,2), and H(α1) > 
H(α2). On the other hand, the relationship between TDR(α1) ≥ TDR(α2) is undetermined.
33 
11 Derivation of the equilibrium for the CH linear city model
If α≤1/2, we are faced with the unconstrained model. Because it can be treated as the special case α=1/2, 
we will not dwell on this matter.34 
This leaves the case α≥1/2. Let us first assume that the whole city is constrained: r f ≤ rbind. Equilib-
rium conditions are given by:
The population constraint can be rewritten as:
Using the boundary condition and noting x =u 2, we have:
Because x >0, the only suitable solution to this 2nd degree equation is:
Last, substituting  x in the boundary condition gives:
We now specify the domain of validity of this solution, that is to say the set of α for which the as-
sumption r f ≤ rbind holds:
This corresponds to our condition α ≥ αcr .
Now let us assume r f > rbind. Equilibrium conditions become:
As previously, we can rewrite the population condition:
Finally, using Ψ (rbind,u )=(Y - arbind )²/4x and arb ind =(2α - 1)Y  yields:
12 Additional result for the CH+T model
The bid rent function Ψ(r,u) is defined as follows:
~ ~
~ ~
~
~ ~
~
~
~
~ ~ ~
~
33 TDR(αi )=N(1 - αi )Y - RA ∫0
r αf (αi ) L(r)dr. The first term decreases with α, but the second one decreases, hence the indeter-
mination.
34 See also Fujita (1989) for a treatment of this case
~
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Resolution of the CH+T bid-rent problem leads to the following solution:
Unlike the CH case, characterizing the binding zone is simple: if not empty, it is a ring located in 
the outer suburbs (possibly encompassing the whole city):
Lemma A
EA(u) is an interval of the form ]rbind (u), rmax[.
Proof
This is a direct consequence of the fact that z(r,u) strictly decreases with r. However, nothing can 
be said about the movement of rbind (u) with u, for the sign of zu(r,u) is unknown in the general case.
Setting a minimum level for the consumption of the z good only affects the most remotely lo-
cated households, who consume more of the housing good due to cheaper housing prices.
Furthermore, the H+T constraint modifies the set of feasible locations. If T(r) > (1 - μ)Y, the 
H+T constraint is automatically violated, meaning that the farthest feasible location changes from rmax 
to r max (μ)<rmax, which is defined by T(r max (μ))=(1 - μ)Y.
Bid-max variables have the same properties as in the CH case. On the other hand, Muth’s rela-
tionship still holds if one uses new lot sizes.
Proposition B
If r ϵ[0,r max (μ)], we have:
Proof
If r ϵE I (u)=[0,rbind (u)[  then we are faced with the unconstrained model, for which Muth’s rela-
tionship obviously holds.
If rϵ]rbind (u),r max (μ)], the constraint is active, hence Ψ (r,u)=((1 - μ)Y - T(r))/s (r,u). Inside the 
binding zone, we have ∂s (r,u)/∂r=0. Therefore, derivation of the bid-rent function gives:
To end the demonstration, we can easily check that Muth’s relationship still holds in r=rbind(u) by 
showing that the left and right derivatives are equal in this point. 
Although we obtain the standard equation for Ψ r (r,u), one must bear in mind that the con-
strained bid-max lot size is smaller than the unconstrained one within the binding zone, with 
s(r,u)<s(r,u). Thus, the H+T constraint magnifies the slope of the bid-rent function (|Ψ r (r,u)|>|Ψr 
(r,u)|).
The last remaining issue lies in the variations of the bid max variables relative to u. With a reason-
ing analogous to the one proposed in 3.1.2, one can show that s(r,u) increases with u while Ψ(r,u) 
decreases with u.
In sum, like in the CH case, the bid-max variables Ψ(r,u), z(r,u), and s(r,u) retain the same varia-
tional properties as their unconstrained versions. Similarly, capping the joint housing plus transport 
expense ratio also decreases the bid-max lot size and the bid rent. Yet, this time it accentuates the slope 
^
^
˘
^ ^ ^
^
^
^ ^ ^
^ ^
^ ^ ^
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of the bid rent function within the binding zone.
Proposition C
For any set of parameters (N,Y,RA) and any couple μ1<μ2, r f (μ1 )≤r f (μ2 ). 
If RA>0 and the binding zone within either the μ1 or μ2 city is non empty (i.e., EA (u (μi ))∩[0,r f (μi 
)]≠∅ for i=1 or i=2), then r f (μ1 )<r f (μ2 ).
Proof
The demonstration of the first point is also based on the boundary rent curve analysis. Given the 
similarities between the CH and CH+T cases (reducing lot size and bid rent for any couple (r,u)), 
we can use the proof of Proposition 2 to show that R Bound (r ,μ1 )≤R Bound (r ,μ2 ), which provides the 
required result. Demonstration of the second point also follows an approach identical to the one pro-
vided in Proposition 2.
13 Derivation of the equilibrium for the CH+T linear city model
Assume r f≥rbind (μ)>0: the H+T constraint is active everywhere except near the CBD. Accordingly, the 
equilibrium conditions become:
Considering that Ψ 'r (r,u)=-T''(r)/s (r,u), the population constraint may be rewritten as:
Hence (boundary condition):
Now let us determine for which range of μ this solution is valid. First, rbind (μ)>0 is equivalent to 
μ< 1/2. Otherwise, r f ≥rbind (μ) is equivalent to the following condition:
Finally, one can easily rewrite the r f formula as:
The case 0 ≤μ ≤ μcr , tantamount to the unconstrained model, may be treated by setting μ = μcr in 
the above formulae.
This only leaves us with the case μ≥1/2, where the whole city is subject to the H+T constraint. The 
equilibrium conditions become:
Plugging the population constraint into the boundary condition yields:
Hence (population constraint):
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